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HOFSTRA lAW REVIEW 
Volume 9, No. 1 Falll980 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND 
THE FREE PRESS: A COMMENT ON 
SOME NEW TRENDS AND 
SOME OLD THEORIES 
William W. Van Alstyne* 
Mter years of ever-advancing success in the Supreme Court, 1 
the "fourth estate" of newspapers now finds itself uncomfortably 
hemmed in by an emerging succession of losses. 2 Providing finan-
cial solace to libel plaintiffs has contracted the definition of a public 
figure, again exposing publications to substantial liability for mere 
marginal inaccuracy. 3 Providing more elbow room for evidence-
*Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. (This article is adapted from a pa-
per prepared for the American Bar Association's Extended Session in Sydney, 
Australia, August 12, 1980. The original title, assigned by an ABA Special 
Committee, was quite different: Why No First Amendment?-The Role of the Press 
in Relation to Justice. Neither Australia nor New Zealand has any equivalent of our 
first amendment. As the occasion of this joint session of the ABA was to compare le-
gal developments in these countries (as well as in the United States) in com-
memoration of the bicentenary of William Blackstone's death in 1780, the original 
point of the title was to raise a challenge to our ANZUS colleagues: Why don't they 
have any first amendment? Given that condition, what indeed is the role of the press 
in their schemes of social justice? 
A portion of that emphasis in the original paper has been retained, but it is now 
made incidental to a related subject of more immediate domestic interest in the 
United States. We differ from our down-under allies not merely in having a first 
amendment which protects freedom of expression in general; it explicitly [and sepa-
rately?] protects "the freedom of the press" in particular. The question has lately 
arisen as to why our own Supreme Court has made less of that fact than many have 
urged it to do: i.e., why has "the press" not been specially and separately regarded 
for purposes of first amendment analysis? The editors of the Hofstra Law Review re-
cently published a Symposium on that subject. 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 559 (1979). This 
adapted paper is offered merely as a postscript to that Symposium.) 
1. See cases cited at notes 22-31 infra. 
2. See cases cited at notes 32-42 infra. But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). 
3. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See also Walston v. Reader's 
Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
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seeking police now contemplates rummaging through newspaper 
files. 4 State statutory privileges respecting a journalist's confidential 
sources are made to yield to the discovery interests of criminal de-
fendants. 5 And first amendment press claims of editorial privacy 
are subordinated to an infinite discovery process relentlessly pressed 
by civil plaintiffs. 6 
As the immunity and privacy of the newspapers' own enter-
prise seem less secure than may reasonably have been supposed in 
the recent past, the press' access to sources of information has also 
been curtailed. Thus, rather uncompelling administrative objec-
tions to press access to a very troubled jail have been held suffi-
cient to limit the press to little more than a guided tour. 7 And 
whatever may be the uncertain case when a criminal case comes to 
actual trial, 8 pretrial hearings-where a very large portion of cases 
are disposed of-appear not to be a place which journalists have 
significant standing to attend.'9 
More exposed in its own accountability and more foreclosed 
from investigating public accountability, the press has also encoun-
4. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
5. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). 
6. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
7. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
8. E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). 
9. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). If certain dicta in Houchins 
v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978), and in Gannett represent a majority of the Supreme 
Court (as I do not think they do), the contraction of access would be very great in-
deed. Thus, concurring in Gannett, Mr. Justice Rehnquist declared: 
Despite the Court's seeming reservation of the question whether the First 
Amendment guarantees the public a right of access to pretrial proceedings, 
it is clear that this Court repeatedly has held that there is no First Amend-
ment right of access in the public or the press to judicial or other govern-
mental proceedings. 
443 U.S. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added). And in Houchins, Chief 
Justice Burger stated that the extent, if any, to which a prison may be open to third-
PartY access is a question which "invites the Court to involve itself in what is clearly 
a legislative task which the Constitution has left [wholly?] to the political pro· 
cesses." 438 U.S. at 12 (Burger, C.J., majority opinion). Neither statement com-
manded a majority in either case, however, and in fact there is no contemporary Su-
preme Court authority for either proposition as so broadly asserted. Cj. Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2830-31 (1980) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) ("Twice before, the Court has implied that any governmental restriction on 
access to information, no matter how severe and no matter how unjustified, would be 
constitutionally acceptable so long as it did not single out the press for special dis-
abilities not applicable to the public at large .... Today, however, for the first time, 
the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important 
information is an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected 
by the First Amendment.") (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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tered newly sustained restrictions even in respect to its most con-
ventional activity--disseminating news and views. This gloomy 
conclusion appears to be particularly warranted if one's view of 
"the press" is not restricted to merely conventional newspapers, 
but includes its electronic cousin and its pamphleteering nephews, 
as well as its scatological offspring. Thus, "adult" book stores may 
be confined by zoning. 10 Thus, the decision in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation11 (sustaining a restriction on radio broadcasts of a rib-
ald political satire) is restrictively reminiscent of the earlier dis-
carded English test of obscenity which permitted the government 
to bar language offensive to the most vulnerable persons. 12 Thus, 
too, political placards may be forbidden by government in places 
where commercial placards may nonetheless be displayed. 13 More-
over, the decision in Greer v. Spock14 (sustaining a military com-
mander's ban of leaflet distribution anywhere on an immense base 
laced with open highways and in many respects suitable for dis-
tribution of ordinary political materials) cuts down the public 
forum for the dissident and unconventional who lack newspapers of 
their own. 
The ostensible trend against the press may renew debate over 
a suggestion originally put forward by one of the associate justices 
of the Supreme Court. 15 Little less than a decade ago, Mr. Justice 
Stewart suggested that there may be distinctive functions and fea-
tures of "the press" that ought to be noticed doctrinally by the Su-
preme Court. The first amendment itself appears on its face to im-
ply the appropriateness of treating "press" cases as not merely 
fungible with "speech" cases in first amendment adjudication. 16 Ac-
cordingly, and especially if it is true that "the press" (even as con-
fined to some subset such as professional journalists and newspa-
10. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
11. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
12. Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). 
13. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). But cf. Police Dep't v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance permitting 
peaceful labor picketing, but prohibiting other peaceful picketing, of schools). 
14. 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976). For a related (and equally severe) decision, see 
Brown Y. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980). 
15. See Address by Mr. Justice Stewart, before the Yale Law School Sesquicen-
tennial Convocation, New Haven, Conn. (Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted in part as Or of 
the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
16. The first amendment sets forth an explicit, additional, prohibition of laws 
abridging freedom of the press ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or [the freedom] of the press .... ") U.S. CaNST. amend. I (emphasis 
added). 
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pers of general circulation) has recently been singled out with 
particular neglect by the Supreme Court, recurring to Mr. Justice 
Stewart's suggestion may now seem more timely than when origi-
nally advanced. That is, reconsideration of the idea may commend 
itself as yielding some prospect of providing a better shelter than 
the poor shelter press claims appear now to receive. Moreover, 
even if it were not true that "the press" is in fact worse off than 
others seeking adjudication of their first amendment claims, the 
idea of reconsidering the logic of addressing "press" claims differ-
ently (and more sympathetically) might still commend itself. If all 
are faring badly under today' s judicial renderings of the first 
amendment, that yields no reason why at least journalists and 
newspapers of general circulation should not seek an appropriate, 
more sheltered place of their own-especially if the first amend-
ment itself contemplates that shelter. 
The literature on this subject is, however, already very sub-
stantial, 17 and there is surely no purpose to be served by pre-
tending to reinvent the wheel. Thus, this is but a comment on the 
subject, and it proceeds briefly in three parts. First, simply for 
perspective, it examines whether the press' own published impres-
sion that it has recently been treated with particular judicial harsh-
ness is well taken, i.e., is "the press" currently worse off under the 
first amendment than others whose first amendment claims have 
also been addressed by the Court in recent years? Second, it 
reexamines whether the press should be treated differently than 
others, at least insofar as that press (or some definable part of the 
press) is critically linked with the larger public's ability to inform 
its own speech. That is, why, indeed, is there as yet no "special" 
17. I am heavily indebted to a great deal of that writing. See, e.g., Abrams, The 
Press Is Different: Reflections on justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 
HoFSTRA L. REv. 563 (1979); Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. 
REv. 731 (1977); Blanchard, The Institutional Press and its First Amendment Privi-
leges, 1978 SUP. CT. REv. 225; Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and 
Decency, 65 VA. L. REV. 785 (1979); Jaxa-Debicki, Problems in Defining the Institu-
tional Status of the Press, 11 RicH. L. REv. 177 (1976); Lange, The Speech and Press 
Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Lewis, A Preferred Position for journalism?, 
7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 595 (1979); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a 
Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 
(1975); Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved DI-
lemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 655 (1979); Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: 
Special Constitutional Privilege for the Institutional Press, 7 HoFSTRA L. REV. 629 
(1979); Comment, Examining the Institutional Interpretation of the Press Clause, 58 
TEX. L. REV. 171 (1979). See also Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming 
a "Preferred Position," 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977). 
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first amendment fitted appropriately both to the press clause and 
to the obvious relationship between the public interest and the 
special protection of professional journalists? And third, virtually as 
a postscript, consideration of this subject in terms of our first 
amendment provides an appropriate place to say something about a 
subject that should be interesting even to people understandably 
impatient with the triviality of so much we write about particular, 
recent, narrow, and merely fashionable topics of constitutional law. 
The third section explores the issue of whether the existence of a 
first amendment ultimately makes a difference between the degree 
of American press freedom and the degree of press freedom en-
joyed in such similar countries as Australia, England and New 
Zealand. 
Is "THE PREss" WORSE OFF THAN OTHERS? 
One clear impression emerges from this survey of more 
than 175 years of press reaction to various freedom of expression 
issues in the United States. It is that, except when their own 
freedom was discernibly at stake, established general circulation 
newspapers have tended to go along with efforts to suppress de-
viations from the prevailing political and social orthodoxies of 
their time and place rather than to support the right to dis-
sent.18 
The felt need of professional journalists for greater breathing 
room within the first amendment admittedly does not and need not 
depend upon a belief that the press has received peculiarly short 
shrift in the courts. Nonetheless, an impression that newspapers 
are disfavored as a class is not without significant weight. If current 
first amendment doctrine, though "neutral" on its face, seems to 
weigh in with special harshness whenever a journalist or a newspa-
per is the litigant, then we are already at least half way home: We 
have made the case that new doctrines are needed to offset the de 
facto judicial prejudice against the press. The question as to 
whether "the press" is practically worse off than others asserting 
standing under the first amendment is not, therefore, of mere cas-
ual academic interest. The answer tends to affect our common 
sense respecting the appropriateness of "reinterpreting" the first 
amendment to combat any unfairness facilitated by the mani-
pulability of current doctrines. 
18. J. LOFTON, THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 279 
(1980). 
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But important or not, the subject will not long detain us. Oc-
casional editorial assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, 19 the 
answer to the question is "No." The press is not worse off than 
others, and the larger profile of first amendment cases of the im-
mediate past decade provides no foundation at all for such a claim. 
Rather, what may more accurately be observed is a more general 
tendency that a number of recent press cases merely reflect: an 
overall conservative judicial rendering of the first amendment. In 
brief, press cases have simply been treated the same as other first 
amendment claims, which is to say not very well or at least not as 
well as some roughly equivalent claims were treated in the recent 
past. The retrenchment is a general one, 20 however, and provides 
no basis for "special" press solicitude or the fashioning of special 
press doctrines. The malaise, if it is a malaise, is one endured by a 
larger body of first amendment persons. Correspondingly, the re-
dress, if there is need for redress, should likewise respond equally 
and across the board. 
A review of the principal cases illustrates an earlier greater 
and now lesser valuing of free speech in general. In 1964, in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 21 the Supreme Court extolled "the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open,"22 sufficient to subordinate interests in repu-
tation to protect even defamatory errors carelessly resulting from 
hurried journalism. In 1971, the court italicized that preference for 
a very free expression in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 23 de-
19. For examples of the severe reaction of some of the press to recent Supreme 
Court decisions, see Address by Mr. Justice Brennan at the Dedication of the S. I. 
Newhouse Center for Law and Justice, in Newark, N.J. (October 17, 1979), reprinted 
at 32 RuTGERS L. REv. 173, 174-75, 178, 180 (1979). See also J. LOFTON, supra note 
18 passim. 
20. A major exception to this statement may appear to be required by the fact 
that "commercial" speech, formerly unprotected under the first amendment, see, 
e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), has in recent years received substan-
tial first amendment protection. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 366-82 
(1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1977); 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). But, for reasons more elaborately examined elsewhere, these cases may more 
appropriately be viewed as part of a renewed interest by the Supreme Court in 
rights of property and of entrepreneurial prerogative. See Van Alstyne, The Recrudes-
cence of Property Rights as the Foremost Principle of Civil Liberties: The First Dec-
ade of the Burger Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer, 1980, at 66. 
21. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
22. I d. at 270. 
23. 403 u.s. 29, 32 (1971). 
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daring that the same highly protective view of the first amendment 
would also apply to private persons attracting general interest. That 
free speech would be given robust protection indeed was signaled 
in the principal obscenity decision of Redrup v. New York24 in 
1967: Not only was the "most vulnerable" person test of Regina 
v. Hicklin25 regarded as altogether impermissible under the first 
amendment, but whatever the sexual explicitness of material, as 
long as it was neither thrust upon unwilling adults nor vended to 
minors, the first amendment completely insulated it from police in-
terference. 26 
That the Court meant seriously what it said about "unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open" speech was never made clearer 
than in the 1971 decision of Cohen v. California, 27 reversing a 
breach-of-peace conviction of one exhibiting his views of the 
Vietnam War by the plainly visible words "Fuck the Draft" on his 
jacket, worn in the public corridors of the Los Angeles county 
courthouse. Not the least remarkable feature of the case was that it 
was not Mr. Justice Douglas who wrote the majority opinion so 
powerfully applying the first amendment. Rather, it was "conserva-
tive" Justice Harlan who did so. That the public forum was very 
broad was also confirmed in Brown v. Louisiana, 28 the 1966 deci-
sion reversing a breach-of-peace conviction for a silent protest 
vigil inside the anteroom of a public library. It was followed by 
Food Employees Local590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 29 extending 
the first amendment even into the parking lot of a private shopping 
mall as a place where nondisruptive picketing could not be en-
joined. And in 1969, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio30 refor-
mulated the clear and present danger test more concretely to pro-
vide fuller first amendment protection even for criminal advocacy 
24. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam). 
25. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868); see text accompanying note 12 supra. 
26. Redrup v. New York was a per curiam decision that had an important im-
pact upon subsequent obscenity cases. The Court in Redrup suggested that the first 
amendment bars any conviction for obscenity unless the defendant has: (1) sold the 
alleged material to juveniles; (2) thrust the material upon unwilling adults; or (3) 
made sales in a "pandering" fashion, i.e., advertising that emphasizes the sexually 
titillating nature of the material. Subsequently, courts utilized Redrup to reverse 
many obscenity convictions. See Teeter & Pember, The Retreat from Obscenity: 
Redrup v. New York, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 188 nn. 95-97 (1969). 
27. 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
28. 383 u.s. 131 (1966). 
29. 391 u.s. 308 (1968). 
30. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
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than can be found in any previous single case. "The constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press," the Court declared, "do 
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite 
or produce such action. "31 
These were, by any fair reckoning, the brightest days for ro-
bust free speech and press we have seen in the American Repub-
lic. Some no doubt also regard them as among our worst, marked 
by a declining civility, a shrillness, and a constitutional permis-
siveness sometimes verging on social anarchy. Be that as it may, 
they clearly marked the high valuation of free-speech and free-
press rights under a powerful and controlling first amendment. 
And that decade is now long gone. Metromedia has been over-
ruled, 32 and the constitutional law of libel is now so very compli-
cated once again that editors must be extremely careful before 
publishing materials that juries might find damaging to reputation. 
Logan Valley has been overruled as well, 33 so that the dimensions 
of the public forum available to lower classes have shrunk back to 
streets and to parks. The Redrup "test"34 that adults may elect to 
read or see whatever they wish from the marketplace, without the 
state's presuming to sanitize that marketplace, is overruled. 35 In-
stead, such material may be totally criminalized except when 
judges deem it to be possessed of "serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value. "36 And in these and in other decisions37 of 
the past decade, we are made fully mindful that constitutional 
31. I d. at 447 (footnote omitted). 
32. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974) (repudiating the 
plurality opinion in Metromedia). See also cases cited at note 3 supra; Note, Whither 
the Limited-Purpose Public Figure?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 403, 423 (1980) ("Since 
Gertz the Supreme Court has enhanced the protection of individual reputations by 
continually refining the public-figure category; the result has been less protection for 
the press."). 
33. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976). But cf. PruneYard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980) (upholding California constitutional 
provision permitting exercise of free speech on privately owned shopping center 
property). 
34. 386 U.S. 767 (1967); see text accompanying note 24 supra. 
35. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
36. I d. at 24, 26. For a recent example of how the reigning "standard" operates, 
see Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980). 
37. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); cases 
cited at notes 10-11, 13-14 supra. 
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provisions are by no means self-defining or self-executing; they de-
pend most conspicuously upon the temper, background, mood, and 
commitment of judges granted the power to apply them. Lately, 
free-speech and free-press rights have run into a new mood-a 
mood that esteems repute more dearly than speech, majoritarian 
notions of "decency" more preciously than freedom, and the exclu-
sivity of property more emphatically than the communicative pre-
rogatives of the relatively unwell-to-do. 38 
These passing observations may scarcely be consoling either to 
the press or to libertarians in general. They are not offered for that 
purpose. They may nonetheless impose some larger perspective on 
the narrowness of press preoccupation with only those cases it finds 
peculiarly offensive to itself. The decision in Houchins v. KQED, 
Inc. 39 (sharply limiting access to jails), the judgment in Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone40 (unleashing libel actions), and the opinion in Gannett 
v. DePasquale41 (foreclosing coverage of pretrial hearings), drew 
especially virulent editorial condemnation. 42 But there was nothing 
special about these decisons: They are pieces in a mosaic descrip-
tive of the seventies in which civility regained some slight edge 
that it had lost during the riskier, frontier first amendment days to-
ward the end of the Warren Court. These decisions merely bound 
the press by limitations similarly binding upon others. 
Finally, in one respect, at least, it may be well that this was 
so. For if, as suggested in the quotation opening this brief section, 
the press has a parochial tendency to take editorial alarm only 
when its own freedom is discernibly at stake, perhaps it is just as 
well that current first amendment doctrine makes no distinction 
between newspapers and unaffiliated citizens. That "we all lose" 
when the least among us loses is itself a thought worth remem-
bering. That "the press" also has something at stake in the first 
amendment, though "the press" is not now the particular litigant in 
the Supreme Court, is not the worst doctrine we might want for 
our Constitution. 
38. See Van Alstyne, supra note 20. 
39. 438 u.s. 1 (1978). 
40. 424 u.s. 448 (1976). 
41. 443 u.s. 368 (1979). 
42. E.g., Lewis, The Open Disarray of Closed justice, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 
1979, at AlB, col. l. 
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SHOULD "THE PREss" BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY 
THAN OTHERS? WHY, INDEED, 
No SPECIAL FmsT .AMENDMENT? 
[Vol. 9: 1 
Though the press has not fared worse than others under the 
first amendment, neither has it fared any better. Whether in re-
spect to claims of access, privilege, libel standards, or still other 
concerns, it has been treated generally the same as others have 
been treated. There is, however, a distinct press clause in the first 
amendment. Moreover, the press is frequently described meta-
phorically as a "fourth estate" of government, which nonetheless 
institutionally stands apart from government, "checking" it through 
vigilant inquiry, publication, and editorial criticism. 43 Accordingly, 
the suggestion has been pressed with increasing frequency that 
"the press" should be treated differently and better. 
On foundations of language, logic, and function, a respectable 
case can thus be made that "the role of the press" in relation to so-
cial justice requires not some "special" first amendment, but 
merely recognition, long overdue, that within the existing first 
amendment there is an explicit acknowledgment that laws valid as 
applied to others may not be equally valid when applied to the 
press. Among the several scholars, lawyers, and judges who have 
urged that the press by some means be treated better, perhaps 
Justices Powell and Douglas have put the point most emphatically: 
"In seeking out the news," Mr. Justice Powell has said, "the press 
... acts as an agent of the public at large."44 Mr. Justice Douglas 
has declared: 
In dealing with the free press gliarantee, it is important to note 
that the interest it protects is not possessed by the media them-
selves. . . . "The press has a preferred position in our constitu-
tional scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set news-
men apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the 
public's right to know .... "45 
Thus, the role of the press, whatever else it may also be, is al-
legedly first and foremost that of public fiduciary: To alert the pub-
lic to defects and incidents of corruption in government; to dis-
43. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. 
B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521. 
44. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dis· 
senting). 
45. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
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cover and disseminate information about conditions otherwise kept 
from public view or which, if not hidden in a legal sense, are 
nonetheless unlikely to be discovered except by persons (namely, 
journalists) whose vocation it is to search them out and bring them 
to public attention as a catalyst for informed and democratic re-
sponse. Though most important as a check on government, the re-
sponsibility of the press presumably extends to investigation and 
reporting of the private sector as well-insofar as the public cannot 
act with respect to private manipulations and abuses if it is kept 
uninformed of them by restraints laid down by laws and/or court 
decisions that throttle the press. 
The argument, as best as I understand it, is therefore not that 
private speech or personal writings should in any respect be newly 
denigrated or deemed in any fashion less protected than each is 
presently protected under the first amendment. It is, rather, that 
in certain cases the vocational affiliation of a journalist with a 
regularly published newspaper of general circulation must not be 
regarded by courts as though it were without additional legal sig-
nificance. 46 Allegedly, the press has a special first amendment sig-
nificance of its own because a third-party first amendment 
interest-namely, "the public's right to know"-is at once engaged 
in cases involving journalists, whereas that vital third-party interest 
is either not engaged at all or at best is only more remotely en-
gaged when the case does not implicate the public's own cham-
pion, its fourth estate, "the press." 
A single example may be sufficient to illustrate the argument. 
Surely it is true that mere considerations of administrative conven-
ience are more than adequate cause to disallow ordinary vendors 
from forcing access to courtrooms, jails, and executive sessions of 
boards of county supervisors to see whether someone there might 
wish to respond to their solicitations. We have no doubt that this 
exclusion raises no substantial first amendment issue, even if we 
concede that, while within that courtroom, jail, or county office 
meeting room, the vendor might notice things he might subse-
quently mention to others as "odd," disturbing, or out of the ordi-
nary. Surely, it is also true, however, that we would not claim 
there is no substantial first amendment issue when a New York 
46. The theme is emphatically developed, and several explicit examples are 
provided in Abrams, supra note 17, at 583-87. See also Nimmer, supra note 17; Sack, 
supra note 17, at 633-37, 648-54. 
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Times reporter or an AP stringer presents his credentials at the 
same door. 
As a regulation of mere reasonable time, place, and manner, a 
flat, no-exceptions prohibition on commercial inquiries in court-
rooms, jails, and executive chambers is assuredly valid. 47 Con-
versely, even as a regulation of mere reasonable time, place, and 
manner, a flat no-exceptions prohibition on news gathering in 
courtrooms, jails, and executive chambers, however, is assuredly 
doubtful-and almost certainly unconstitutional. 48 And Why? Pre-
sumably because the vendor's case only remotely engages any plau-
sible public first amendment interest. In contrast, the journalist's 
case seems at once substantially and directly to engage two power-
fully combined first amendment interests: the first amendment 
"freedom of the press" and, through the protection of that free-
dom, the public's "right" to know-a right without which the pub-
lic's own freedom of speech can be but uninformed or misin-
formed. 
I take it that the force of the argument for preferred press 
treatment may be readily extended to other areas of frequent con-
troversy to round out a wider circumference of first amendment 
press rights in general. Thus, persons reposing confidence in pri-
vate citizens who they anticipate might be subpoenaed to disclose 
that confidential information may be less willing to share what they 
know. But that potential loss of speech is one which is overcome 
by the "fair trial" needs of a criminal defendant, the indictment 
functions of grand juries, or even the legislative, fact-finding obli-
gations of congressional committees. However, the case is arguably 
a different one when the individual facing subpoena is a journalist 
(who has come to some litigant's attention solely because the jour-
nalist's newspaper brought to public knowledge what the public 
47. Although "commercial speech" (i.e., communication proposing a sale or ex-
change) is no longer orphaned from the first amendment (see cases cited at note 19 
supra), it remains subject to time, place, and manner restrictions far more severe 
than access restrictions applicable to noncommercial inquiries. Compare Breard v. 
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) with Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 145-49 (1943); compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426-32 (1978) with Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-62 (1978). 
48. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). But is this 
the proper comparison? Is there any reason to suppose, for instance, that a flat ban 
on vendors in courtrooms would be invalid as applied to a newspaper vendor? Note 
that subject to some equivocation, see note 60 infra, the Court in Richmond News 
is careful not to undermine the position it took in Saxbe and Pell, see notes 44-45 
supra, rejecting claims of "special" first amendment standing for "the press." 
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will be unable to learn about at all if those providing journalists 
with information must fear subpoenas). A reporter allegedly re-
quires heightened first amendment protection, albeit not especially 
for himself and not merely for the immediate benefit of his inform-
ant. He requires it, rather, in order that the public interest in 
knowledge about serious matters not be impeded. 49 It is arguably 
contradictory to lay upon a journalist a professional command (a 
first amendment "duty" as it were) to report the results of his in-
vestigations to the publio-and simultaneously subject him to con-
ditions that render his performance of that very duty impossible. 
Yet, if a journalist cannot guarantee confidentiality to his sources, 
he often cannot perform his duty-and if he must go to prison as a 
condition of doing his job as a journalist, then not just he, but all 
the public, is worse off. Similarly, in ordinary libel cases a standard 
of liability for "negligent" damaging falsehood may very well be the 
appropriate general standard. But the self-censoring rules which 
newspapers will be forced to adopt if that standard is applied to 
them would compel them to suppress much truthful and important 
material as well; "reckless" carelessness in publishing damaging 
falsehoods should be required in damage actions brought against 
journalists in their professional capacity-lest the public's "right to 
know" be impaired. so 
In these and myriad other ways, then, a "system" of differenti-
ated first amendment freedoms for the regularly reporting press 
can be articulated. Quite concretely, that system, if approved, may 
ambitiously secure greater protection to the regularly reporting 
press than to individuals in cases where public reporting is not in-
volved or at best is tenuously involved. This system would provide 
the regularly reporting press with: (1) More substantial entitle-
ments of access; (2) more substantial entitlements of confidentiality; 
49. But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). (But note that if newspa-
per reporters were able to invoke some degree of first amendment privilege, the 
"privilege" would not necessarily be different from or greater than that provided to 
many others with first amendment standing. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); 
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).) 
50. An excellent analysis defending the prudential wisdom of first amendment 
doctrines against criticism that they are excessively protective (i.e., shielding false 
and sometimes damaging speech unimportant to any first amendment value) is pro-
vided by BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the 
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978). As Professor BeVier 
notes, such doctrines do not currently favor or disfavor journalists vis-a-vis others 
who speak or write on issues of political significance. 
14 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9: 1 
(3) more substantial protections from libel; (4) more substantial ex-
emptions from injunctions; and (5) more substantial immunities 
from searches and seizures. Moreover, to be fair to the argument, 
let us be quite clear that at no point does this "system" of excep-
tional press freedoms presume to assert an absolute immunity. 
Rather, it is a claim merely of a more limited accountability 
founded on the special linkage of the regularly reporting press to 
"the public's right to know." 
If this appeal were otherwise sound, I do not think it would 
be vulnerable to criticism merely because there will be foreseeable 
difficulties in defining "the press." To be sure, that is a problem 
which we do not now have, insofar as there has been no Supreme 
Court ratification of this theory. No need has yet arisen in any case 
to define the "regularly reporting" press, to distinguish "profes-
sional" journalists, or even to determine whether the theory is ap-
propriately limited only to those who are "journalists" (rather than, 
say, "authors" or "potential publishers"). But if the theory were 
sound, objections based on difficulties of definition would obviously 
not be conclusive per se. After all, those several state legislatures 
that have already adopted statutes51 establishing some kind of "re-
porter's privilege" have not found it impossible to draw some use-
ful and presumably defensible lines. We have no reason to imagine 
that the problem would be insuperable if, aided by those legisla-
tive suggestions, the Supreme Court were to constitutionalize a 
"preferred" position for the regularly reporting press. 52 
But despite the highly plausible logic that can thus be brought 
to bear to define additional free-press protections, the case for 
doing so is nonetheless very uneasy. Indeed, despite my own best 
effort to restate the case convincingly, on balance the case may be 
highly vulnerable on its merit. There are at least two reasons that 
make it much weaker than it first appears. 
For one thing, in virtually every instance where the "public's 
right to know'' is present-as the essential basis to assert a special 
press claim-that special public interest will simultaneously be off-
51. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd) (Supp. 1980-1981); 
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW§ 79-h (McKinney 1976). 
52. For an amplification of the argument that problems of appropriate defini-
tion alone are insufficient to balk at the recognition of preferred press rights, see 
Abrams, supra note 17, at 580-83. For a concrete example of a "reporter's shield" law 
(applied to defeat a civil libel plaintiff's discovery), see Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 277 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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set and cancelled out by a countervailing reason of the same 
weightiness. Ironically, that cancelling, countervailing reason is it-
self inseparable from what the public is made to know by the 
regularly reporting press. Consider, for instance, the paradox of ap-
plying the argument of special protection to protect the regularly 
reporting press more than others might be protected in libel cases. 
An individual who carelessly defames another in a private let-
ter or in the course of a conversation with a friend may, to an ex-
tent that he may thereafter be sued successfully for libel or for 
slander, thus be more inhibited than he otherwise would be in his 
speaking and writing. Recovery is nonetheless allowed, and such 
recovery is deemed consistent with the first amendment, because 
we do not suppose that free speech should always be subsidized by 
those whom it palpably injures. 53 Rather, the libeler or slanderer is 
occasionally made to bear the cost of provable harm resulting from 
his speech or writing, and we do not regard this as inconsistent 
with the first amendment. The argument to require something 
more before a newspaper or journalist may be held liable in a like 
circumstance, we have seen, is predicated on the theory that the 
journalist is fiduciary of the public's right to know. Though the 
same observation applies to the individual, who may be inhibited 
from speaking or writing true statements as well as falsehoods, the 
loss of the public's right to know is not thought to be of the same 
magnitude. 
On the other hand, the very fact that the careless falsehoods of 
a journalist are published in a newspaper of general circula-
tion-that they are not just spoken to a single friend or written in a 
single private letter-commensurately magnifies the injury done to 
the defamed person. Surely it would be most ironic if, in cases of 
defamation, the rule of law were that (a) the greater the circulation 
of the libel to the public, then (b) the greater the constitutional 
privilege of the libeler. 
Exactly the same cancelling consideration applies against spe-
cial claims by reporters in regard to the general conflict of "fair 
trial" and "free press." An individual who would tell others that he 
knows of evidence the prosecution possesses but cannot use54 may 
53. The point is made forcefully in a recent article by Professor Ingber who de-
veloped quite a powerful argument for reinstating libel actions albeit with far more 
elabomte refinements than current doctrine recognizes. See Ingber, supra note 17, at 
850-58. 
54. E.g., evidence excluded under some mere rule of evidence or evidence 
barred by opemtion of a constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule. 
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have only a trivial effect on the ability of the accused to secure a 
fair trial; if the teller's tale is but a fragment of private, circulating 
gossip, there may be little difficulty in impaneling a literate jury 
neither affected by nor even aware of it. However, if a journalist 
publishes the same story in his newspaper of general circulation 
(the very condition of invoking "the public's right to know") the 
danger posed by pretrial publication is far more clear and present 
than were a newspaper of general circulation not involved. Again, 
it would be ironic if the rule of law in pretrial-restraint cases were 
that (a) the greater the likelihood that publication will increase the 
difficulties of securing a fair and impartial jury, then (b) the greater 
the constitutional exemption of the publisher from pretrial re-
straints. 
In some measure, the same observation can be offered as well 
in attempting to apply the theory of preferred protection for the 
press even in respect to confidentiality of news sources. Superior 
protection of such confidentiality is thought to be important be-
cause the public (and not just the newspaper) will suffer if individ-
uals supplying information must fear the subsequent disclosure of 
their identities. On the other hand, superior protection from forced 
disclosure of news sources may also mean merely that journalists 
are at greater liberty to invent the news; a priori, greater immunity 
from having to validate a story plainly can be as much an incentive 
for sensationalized fiction as for the fearless reporting of actual cor-
ruption. And we have ample a posteriori experience in this country 
to know that the supposition is true. The regularly reporting press 
in the United States includes the National Enquirer, True Detec-
tive, The Globe, and an enormous staple of lesser tabloids and 
journals, as well as the New York Times and The Christian Science 
Monitor. Again, it would be a most peculiar rule of law which 
would provide that (a) incentives for profit by fictionalizing stories 
in the regularly reporting press (and exceptional protection of 
source confidentiality is one such incentive) should be greater than 
~) incentives furnished to those not published either generally or 
for profit. 
None of this is to say that "the press" should therefore be 
treated less well55 under the first amendment than unaffiliated per-
55. Although that, in fact, was the original manner in which the press was dis-
tinguished under English law. See note 71 infra and accompanying text. May it have 
been explicitly to insure that "speech," though mass-produced by inexpensive 
presses, was not to be treated on that account as systematically different from more 
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sons, isolated pamphleteers, etc. But insofar as "the public's right 
to know"56 is invoked as the principled distinction to establish 
preferred status for the regularly reporting press, it is a distinction 
that assuredly cuts both ways. The conjunction of freedom of the 
press with "the public interest" is a conjunction a priori adequate 
to distinguish the regularly reporting press from all others, to be 
sure. But the distinction it yields is logically a distinction that may 
render newspapers more, rather than less, accountable for what 
they publish: (a) less entitlement to withhold sources (in order that 
the public may know the source and thus be better able to judge 
for itself the credibility of the report); (b) less immunity from 
pretrial restraint (in order that the accused not be substantially 
handicapped in securing a fair trial); and (c) greater liability for 
damaging and false reports (in keeping with the magnitude of 
reputational harm commensurate with public circulation of the 
falsehood from a seemingly credible source). 
To make the point plainer still, consider the comparison be-
tween "special" first amendment protections for journalists, and 
"special" first amendment protections for academics. 57 It is now 
fairly familiar learning that at least in respect to their professional 
utterances (e.g., their selection of material for use in the class-
room), public school teachers and public university professors are 
protected by a latitude of first amendment protection greater than 
that which can be successfully asserted by other kinds of public 
employees-protection identified with their "academic" freedom, 
i.e., their duties as academics. 58 What is less frequently noted in 
ordinary (i.e., oral) expression, that the first amendment was composed as it was? 
Compare Abrams, supra note 17, with Lange, supra note 17. 
56. For a recent, highly critical review of this alleged right, see BeVier, An 
Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 
CALIF. L. REv. 482 (1980). 
57. See generally R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ACADE!I.IIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, in 
1 ENCYLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 384-87 (1930). For discussions at-
tempting to develop a coherent first amendment subset of "academic freedom" (as 
distinct from protecting faculty members merely as citizens in respect to speaking 
and writing nonprofessionally about controversial political subjects, see, e.g., Picker-
ing v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-70 (1968)); see Van Alstyne, The Spe-
cific TheonJ of Academic Freedom and the General Issues of Civil Liberty, in 
THE CONCEPT OF ACADE!I.IIC FREEDOM 59 (E. Pincoffs ed. 1972). 
58. See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1152-55 (N.D. Ala. 
1980); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97 (1968), is paradigmatically an academic freedom case, but was in fact de-
cided wholly without reference to academic freedom. 
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respect to academic freedom, however, is that it is by no means a 
one-way street, that is, it is not a concept that merely enlarges the 
first amendment status of academics. It is quite true that first 
amendment-rooted claims of academic freedom will enable a pro-
fessional educator to address theories pertinent to the general sub-
ject of his instruction, and/or to utilize certain instructional materi-
als despite the contrary demand of the state, and to resist the state 
on a first amendment claim of academic freedom. It is also true, 
however, that there is a trade-off properly imposed upon profes-
sional academics. While they may defend against charges of 
insubordination-insofar as they ignore public law directives that 
foreclose a professionally defensible treatment of a given subject-
on grounds of academic freedom, they are simultaneously subject 
to a professionally taxing standard of accountability. That is, aca-
demics are subject to a higher standard of care than one of but or-
dinary, layman's care. 
An academic cannot be discharged because of the felt perni-
ciousness of what he exposes as a germane theory in a course on 
political theory, on anthropology, on psychology, on astronomy. He 
may readily be discharged insofar as the presentation lacks profes-
sionalism, however, though publication of the same unprofessional 
(or merely nonprofessional) presentation in general would not be 
punishable and would, rather, merely enrich the author. 59 The first 
amendment frees the general public to be "careless" in declaring 
what the law is, in writing and in publishing what the law is, 
though anything more than the most casual investigation would 
have disclosed that the cases relied upon and cited in the presenta-
tion have long since been overruled, or the statute said to be dis-
positive has in fact been repealed. Chronic carelessness of this 
genre is more than adequate cause to propose the termination of 
an academic, however, and not "despite" claims of academic free-
dom but, rather, as implicitly consistent with special academic 
obligation-an obligation of professional care. The "system" of first 
amendment academic freedom is, in this respect, symmetrical: 
atypical prerogatives of professional discretion in the selection and 
presentation of teaching and research; atypical requirements of ac-
countability applicable to the professional. 
Equivalently, were journalists to be "specially" regarded un-
der the press clause of the first amendment, the question is an 
59. See the discussion in Van Alstyne, supra note 57. 
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open one: In what respects might they be "special"? One answer 
(not the answer some of the press may have been thinking about) is 
that they are to be "specially" accountable, i.e., more answerable 
than laymen. A symmetry may thus emerge in respect to reporters 
that trades off some special advantages for some special liabilities. 
For instance, if journalists may assert access to certain public facili-
ties either in "first amendment preference" to laypersons (as when 
space is limited)60 or in first amendment exclusion of laypersons (as 
when the meeting is "closed"), it may follow symmetrically that the 
ensuing published story must meet a standard of professionalism 
commensurate with the privileged standing of the reporter. A 
"careless" story, a story misreporting what was said, a story shaded 
to leave out of account pertinent counterpoints developed in the 
course of the meeting, thus becomes professionally irresponsible, 
giving rise to the termination of the journalist's employment and/or 
liability. By no means, however, would such a story be adequate to 
sustain a cause of action for damages, a retraction, or something 
else if published on the authority of one acquiring it under no 
claim of special first amendment access. The point does not neces-
sarily mean that journalists (and their newspaper employers) can 
make no case at all for special first amendment treatment. It does, 
however, indicate that they must simultaneously take into account 
the full, logical implications of that treatment. 
A second, intimately related consideration also suggests that 
the press should not advance a claim to preferred first amendment 
treatment as a fiduciary of "the public" and the public's vaunted 
"right" to know. Currently, despite the colloquial identification of 
the press as "a fourth estate," insofar as the press has power of its 
own (that often usefully checks and balances the established power 
of government) it may operate most effectively and most legiti-
mately precisely because it forms no part of government. Each 
journal, whether trashy and truckling or fearless and admirable, 
does not now submit its editorial autonomy to public regulation. 
60. Dicta in Richmond Newspapers raise this as a real possibility. See 100 S. 
Ct. at 2830 n.18 (Burger, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 2840 n.3 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). Compare those two with the more careful noting of the problem by Mr. Justice 
Brennan. I d. at 2832 n.2 (Brennan, Marshall, J.J., concurring in judgment). This way 
of resolving "scarcity" of access by conferring special preferred access rights upon 
journalists (or, indeed, upon only certain journalists) may at once be employed to 
impose a legal demand of greater accountability, accuracy, and care of what they 
alone are thus especially privileged to see and to record. See text accompanying note 
72 infra. 
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The point is an important one. It was made most emphatically in 
the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo. 61 invalidating a state statute requiring a 
newspaper to furnish "reply" space to any candidate for public of-
fice dealt with in disparaging fashion by that paper. Quoting 
Chafee' s observation that "liberty of the press is in peril as soon as 
the government tries to compel what is to go into a newspaper, "62 
the Court denied the propriety of a statute that attempted, even to 
the extent to furnishing a mere right of personal reply, to interfere 
with the editorial autonomy of newspapers. In doing so, the Court 
was but echoing an observation offered more than a century and a 
half earlier by Thomas Jefferson: 
I deplore . . . the putrid state into which our newspapers have 
passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit 
of these who write them . . . It is however an evil for which 
there is no remedy, our liberty depends on the freedom of the 
press. and that cannot be limited without being lost. 63 
It is exactly the same spirit that led Mr. Justice Douglas in C.B.S. 
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 64 to disagree vigorously with the very 
different holding of the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC. 65 which sustained the FCC's regulatory demand that radio 
and television licensees at once notify and offer free reply time to 
any person dealt with disparagingly in the context of some contro-
versial public topic. "Both TV and radio news broadcasts, Douglas 
noted, "frequently tip the news one direction or another and even 
try to turn a public figure into a character of disrepute."66 "Yet," 
he quite rightly observed, "so do the newspapers and the maga-
61. 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
62. 2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947), 
quoted at 418 U.S. at 258. 
63. T. }EFFERSON, DEMOCRACY 150-51 (S. Padover ed. 1939). See also Jefferson's 
reflections on newspapers in his letter to John Norvell, written in 1807: 
Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper. Truth itself be-
comes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle .... I will add, that 
the man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who 
reads them; inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to truth than he 
whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell, from Washington (June 11, 1807), re-
printed in part in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS }EFFERSON 581, 
581 (A. Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS }EFFERSON], 
64. 412 u.s. 94 (1973). 
65. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (Justice Douglas did not participate in the Red Lion 
case.). 
66. 412 U.S. at 155 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment). 
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zines and other segments of the press. The standards of TV, radio, 
newspapers, or magazines-whether of excellence or mediocrity-
are beyond the reach of Government. "67 
But note at once how this important security of the fourth es-
tate from the encumbrance of public regulation respecting the con-
tent of private commercial publications may be at risk if one's ac-
cent is not on the freedom of the press but is, rather, on the 
public's right to know. In the Red Lion case, the Court accepted 
the view that radio and television are not like newspapers and 
magazines; they are, rather, licensees permitted special access to a 
limited number of airwaves which are awarded without charge. 
The superior and exclusive access right provided to a given licen-
see for a particular wavelength and territory is not determined by 
some random lottery among applicants; it is determined by choos-
ing among rival applicants the one whose proposed programs will 
best serve "the public interest," with each such licensee "agreeing" 
as well to abide by additional program content regulations believed 
to assure that public interest. Here, the Supreme Court declared, 
"[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the 
broadcasters, which is paramount. "68 
It takes little imagination to understand how readily adaptable 
that dictum would be to any claim a newspaper might make success-
fully for special first amendment treatment linked to the "public 
right to know." As some say, "[i]n dealing with the free press 
guarantee, it is important to note that the interest it protects is not 
possessed by the media themselves, "69 but by the public. That 
view, however, has double-edged implications. If only an accred-
ited newspaper reporter may inspect a jail, though a member of 
the NAACP, a representative of some splinter political party, or a 
feature writer of a pulp magazine may not, then surely it will be-
come reasonable to attach strings to the privilege so extended to 
"accredited" journalists alone. If only members of "the [special] 
press" may attend a pretrial suppression hearing, undoubtedly it 
seems just to impose additional restrictions of "fairness" and limita-
tion on the story the press reporters are privileged to file. If re-
porters can be successfully sued for libel only if their damaging 
falsehoods were "reckless," while common back fence gossips may 
be successfully sued for merely "negligent" libel, then surely it is 
67. Id. 
68. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (dictum) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
69. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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also fair for reporters to be more, rather than less, subject to sub-
poenas and written interrogatories compelling disclosure of their 
sources-to determine whether in fact they were reckless. The 
greater privilege of a reporter in regard to defamation (to serve the 
public's right to know) may entail a greater duty (to serve the pub-
lic's right to know his sources )-or so, at least, a consistent, logical, 
and altogether straightfmward argument can be made. 70 
Not long after William Caxton introduced the first "modem" 
press to England (a Guttenburg press with movable type), the 
Crown recognized the special ability of such instruments to reach 
large audiences cheaply. The recognition that the press was there-
fore "special" developed virtually at once into a regime of special 
regulation: No press could be owned except as registered, and 
nothing could be printed save what the Stationer's Monopoly and 
Star Chamber determined to be in the public interest. Precisely 
because the press was special in its capacity to influence the pub-
lic's "right to know" in England, it was thought suitable to impose 
a special order to secure it from unsafe and promiscuous uses. 71 
Today' s deja vu of that controversy is cosmetically distinguish-
able. While each owner of a mimeograph machine or each person 
with access to a Xerox copier is not so inextricably linked with the 
public interest to warrant distinctive treatment under the first 
amendment, working journalists and most if not all of the 
regularly reporting press may be thus distinctively linked. As to 
them, the issue is not fundamentally different from what it became 
in England, after 1476. It is recast in terms of the separateness of 
the press clause and notions of fiduciary privilege to serve "the 
public right to know." But the lure is still to command their sepa-
ration from others also sheltered by the first amendment-to find 
"different" standards suitable for "the press." 
To be sure, we have been examining the controversy from the 
perspective of argument that seeks only specially to advantage "the 
press," rather than to disadvantage it. But the difficulty of the ar-
gument is that the best reasons for favoring a privileged press are 
70. For a discussion of techniques of imposing access rights to newspapers on 
behalf of third parties, based partly on arguments directed against every sort of any 
special governmental aid involved in the newspaper business, see Yackle, Confes-
sions of a Horizontalist: A Dialogue on the First Amendment, 27 KAN. L. REV. 541 
(1979). 
71. See F. SmBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776 (1952), 
and the several references in W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1924). 
See also Abrams, supra note 17, at 575 n.79 (1979). 
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identically the best reasons for imposing special burdens upon that 
same press. We have carried over from the English libel per se, 
and we have already imposed upon radio and television substantial 
"public" obligations-in exchange for exclusive, cost-free licensing 
privileges-that illustrate how these trade-offs tend inevitably to 
work themselves out. 72 There is no reason to suppose that the mat-
ter will be different for newspapers should they, too, "succeed" in 
securing particular rights, privileges, exemptions, or immunities 
that a crank pamphleteer, for example, cannot claim under a single 
and indivisible amendment. 73 
My own conclusion is, therefore, that it is not infeasible to de-
fine a class of journalists and to give special first amendment pro-
tections to those scriveners. Rather, it would be a mistake to do so. 
Presumably the definitional line would have to be drawn in rela-
tion to the cohort of journalists who are "responsible," who will not 
merely march to their own interests or those of commercial pub-
lishing firms, but who faithfully abide by "public interest" stan-
dards-standards that make them more like commentators on the 
BBC: admirable, restrained, and less free than the muckrakers 
and the lone pamphleteers. For all journalists to aspire to be pro-
fessional, ethical, altruistic, and mindful of the public interest in 
their work is assuredly desirable. It seems doubtful, however, that 
either the press or the public would gain much from a constitu-
tional separation that would establish caste distinctions within the 
fourth estate: one group enjoying certain additional privileges, but 
subject also to certain additional accountabilities; the ··rest," indis-
tinguishable from any person who may own a mimeograph ma-
chine, having only "ordinary" first amendment rights, but unbur-
dened by the extra baggage of a fiduciary's "public" obligations. I 
thus agree wholeheartedly with the well-stated conclusions of 
Anthony Lewis, who covered the Supreme Court for the New York 
Times for many years: 
Freedom of the press arose historically as an individual liberty. 
Eigtheenth-century Americans saw it in those terms, and the 
same view is reflected in Supreme Court decisions; freedom of 
72. See, e.g., Powe, "Or of the [Broadcast] Press," 55 TEX. L. REV. 39 (1976); 
Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 
29 S.C. L. REv. 539 (1978). 
73. The same point is very persuasively developed in Blanchard, supra note 
17. See BeVier, supra note 56; Bezanson, supra note 17; Lange, supra note 17; 
Lewis, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 17, at 190-96. 
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speech and of the press, Chief Justice Hughes said, are "funda-
mental personal rights." To depart from that principle-to adopt 
a corporate view of the freedom of the press, applying the press 
clause of the first amendment on special terms to the "institu-
tion" of the news media-would be a drastic and unwelcome 
change in American constitutional premises. It would read the 
Constitution as protecting a particular class rather than a com-
mon set of values. And we have come to understand, after much 
struggle, that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens."74 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT MAKE? 
This essay has addressed recent cases involving the press 
wholly in first amendment terms. Admittedly very narrow in its 
preoccupation with constitutional doctrine, it is by no means atyp-
ical in this respect. Statutory and common law developments are 
doubtless of immense practical significance in their own right, but 
we take it virtually as given that when we "really" wish to know 
how safely or how freely publication can proceed against the per-
sistent tendency to censor or to suppress, meaningful discussion 
will tum at once to the first amendment. 
Indeed, the first amendment may be regarded as so central to 
the meaningful protection of free speech and press in the United 
States, that even Tocqueville's familiar observation75 fails ade-
quately to have anticipated the American propensity. It is not 
merely that political questions in this country have tended gener-
ally to have become adjudicated questions; it is, rather, that the 
most significant political and legal questions have tended to be-
come constitutional questions. This appears emphatically to be so 
with respect to speech and press. Whether the subject is contempt 
of court, access to government places, privileges of confidentiality, 
varieties of prior restraint, standards of libel, the actionability of se-
ditious utterance or something else still again, they are all first 
amendment questions with us. It scarcely strains the truth to sug-
gest that in the United States, therefore, imagining a free press 
without a first amendment is as difficult conceptually as attempting 
to imagine a powerful Archimedean lever without a fulcrum. The 
74. Lewis, supra note 17, at 626 (footnotes omitted). 
75. "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not re-
solved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 280 (Knopf ed. 1946). 
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very idea is a paradox. The first amendment is the fulcrum; it 
alone, ultimately, provides a reliable purchase for the leverage of a 
free, diverse, and boisterously robust press in the United States. 
The assumption of first amendment centrality is not, of course, 
based simply on the presence of the amendment per se, that is, it 
is not derived merely from the "pie in the sky" rhetoric of the 
amendment itself: There is surely general recognition that a num-
ber of nations (including the Soviet Union) have some kind of 
parchment facsimile to the first amendment-but of no equivalent 
efficacy. Rather, reliance upon the first amendment as tending to 
make a critical difference in conditions of free speech and press 
takes into account not merely the amendment's own near-absolute 
language, but its structural outfitting within the legal system as 
well. That "outfitting" provides that the amendment has a positive 
law (rather than a merely precatory) significance; the amendment is 
established as part of the supreme law and discountenances all in-
consistent lesser enactments. Its application is committed to life-
tenured judges virtually unremovable by government. It may be 
invoked readily in litigation by private parties. It is alterable as su-
preme law solely by federal processes of amendment quite de-
liberately stacked against the feasibility of precipitate change-
extraordinary two-thirds majorities of both houses of the national 
legislature must propose a change, unless, as has never happened, 
concurrent resolutions by two-thirds of the state legislatures pre-
cipitate an amending convention, and that change will fail unless 
three-fourths of the state legislatures separately concur in the 
change as well. 76 One, or another, or all of these features are 
lacking in India, in Korea, in Chile, in Saudi Arabia-to recite the 
names of some few countries jingoistically included in the "free 
world" to contrast them with "communist" countries-and insofar 
as they are lacking, conditions of press freedom seem, from time to 
time, to be utterly insecure. 
Yet, if this much is true, it is also true that there are some na-
tional aberrations that would seem to give us pause. One such 
anomaly is that our own most look-alike neighbor, Canada, has no 
first amendment. The most recent efforts by the Canadian Prime 
Minister to put a U.S.-style bill of rights into the Canadian con-
stitution, moreover, have been rebuffed. As reported by the Asso-
76. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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ciated Press in early September, 1980, Mr. Trudeau's effort en-
countered strong opposition because provincial leaders "object to 
having the courts, rather than legislative bodies, interpret the ap-
plication of such basic rights as freedom of speech or of the press, 
as in the United States. "77 In England, which we also do not re-
flexively dismiss as unfree or intolerant, the situation is the same. 
In 1980, the basic law of England is as Lord Chief Justice Holt ob-
served it to be in 1700. "An Act of Parliament," he noted, "can do 
no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd. "78 
In New Zealand also, free speech and press disputes are resolved 
wholly without benefit of a written constitution. 79 And in Australia, 
there is a written constitution and, as in the United States, it is su-
perintended by the power of judicial, substantive constitutional re-
view. But the Australian Constitution has no provision extending 
substantive constitutional review to the protection of free speech or 
press, because Australia has no equivalent at all to our own first 
amendment. 80 
77. Associated Press wire story, reprinted in Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 
11, 1980, at 17C, col. 2. A similar account is given in N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1980, at 
A3, col. 4 (city ed.). For a subsequent report that an effort would be made (as pre-
dicted in the N.Y. Times article, supra) to secure an entrenched bill of rights without 
provincial approval, see Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 2. 
78. City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (1700). Evidently, the sit-
uation is essentially the same today: "In Britain, the phrase 'judicial review' is 
merely a flattering way of describing statutory interpretation-the judicial approach 
to which is confined by strict rules, though there are signs in recent cases of a more 
liberal approach developing." Scarman, Fundamental Rights: The British Scene, 78 
COLUM. L. REv. 1575, 1585 (1978). See L. ScARMAN, ENGLISH LAw 76-82 (1974). 
For a recent review of developments in England, see Karst, judicial Review and the 
Channel Tunnel, 53 S. CALIF. L. REv. 447, 447 (1980) ("The issue has not exactly 
captured the British public's interest."). 
79. For a recent review of legal developments in New Zealand respecting the 
law and the press, see Burrows, The Law and the Press, 4 OTAGO L. REV. 119 
(1978). While noting that there have been no prosecutions "for either blasphemy or 
sedition in New Zealand for a very long time," id. at 122, Burrows also comments 
that "that great journalistic event that we know simply as 'Watergate' would never 
have got off the ground in New Zealand or Britain .... " I d. at 126. For additional 
views of free speech, the press, and a Bill ofRights for New Zealand, see ESSAYS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (9th ed. K. Keith, 1968). 
80. For a recent review, see E. CAMPBELL & H. WHITMORE, FREEDOM IN 
AUSTRALIA (1973). In their most pertinent chapter ("Constitutional Protection of Hu-
man Rights"), the authors observe that "[e]xamples can be found of Australian laws, 
which, if judged by, say, the United States Bill of Rights, would probably be found 
unconstitutional." Id. at 455. Still they conclude, "We oursleves have yet to be per-
suaded that a Bill of Rights, especially of the entrenched and judicially enforceable 
variety, would inevitably provide better security against unwarranted invasions of in-
dividual liberty than is provided at present." ld. at 455. For two very recent com-
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Despite stirrings in each of these countries, moreover, there 
currently appears to be no sufficient enthusiasm to adopt an 
American-style constitution with a first amendment provision "guar-
anteeing" free speech or a free press from governmental abridgment. 
In fact, therefore, it is not easy to match the actual conditions of 
free speech and press by uniformly correlating one's impressions of 
those actual conditions with the presence or absence of a first 
amendment, akin to our own, enforced by an entrenched judiciary 
equivalent to our own. On second impression, then, it is much 
less clear what difference a first amendment makes. Our domestic 
rhetoric (and "first amendment" preoccupations) suppose that it is 
indispensable to the adequate protection of free speech and a free 
press. Equally literate, English-speaking countries otherwise 
sharing a common legal system evidently regard such an en-
trenched provision as altogether dispensable and, evidently, not 
sufficiently useful even to be worth its occasional perplexities or 
marginal social costs. It is implausible to suppose that we may both 
be right about this matter. 
It is quite possible, however, that "we" may both be quite 
wrong-at least insofar as the respective positions as described 
above do not significantly exaggerate the tendency domestically to 
regard an entrenched first amendment as indispensable, and the 
tendency among our Blackstone relatives to regard it as altogether 
inconsequential. As the occasion to prepare this brief review of one 
of our domestic first amendment issues was originally this larger 
occasion-that is, to examine comparatively the course of free-
speech developments among the several former western colonies of 
England since the death of William Blackstone just two centuries 
ago-inevitably the question of what difference the first amend-
ment makes intruded itself into every comparison. 
No confident single answer emerges, but I believe the Ameri-
can example, while much too frequently oversold (and thereby dis-
credited by the extravagance of domestic claims), may yet com-
mend itself abroad-at least, as in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and in England, where conditions are not radically dissimilar from 
conditions here, and where there appears little to dread from a ju-
diciary itself not very radical and unlikely to run amuck. I mean to 
extend this essay briefly, to offer a mild defense for this suggestion. 
parative reviews of press rights in Australia and in New Zealand, see Hunt and 
McCarthy, Why No First Amendment? The Role of the Press in Relationship to Jus-
tice, in AMERICAN/AUSTRALIAN/NEW ZEALAND LAW 133, 147 (1980). 
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And to put the answer at the outset, it comes to this: A judicially 
enforceable, <C entrenched" first amendment is doubtless not indis-
pensable to the maintenance of free speech and, assuredly, pro-
vides no ultimate check at all against a persistent general spirit of 
intolerance. It may add a useful assistance to free speech and to a 
freer press than may otherwise tend to find stable support in its 
absence, however, and provision for such an amendment need not 
be seen at all as requiring a «trade off'' for other kinds of protec-
tion which the legal system of a country otherwise already pro-
vides. As an estimate of whimsy, in comparing the precedents and 
writings among our western Blackstone cousins, I think the first 
amendment may make about a 12% difference (a great deal less 
than that in some areas, somewhat more in others)-not enough to 
be startling, yet, oddly, just enough to make it a safe venture 
-and thereby, quite possibly, a commendable one as well. 
The principal problem with commending the first amendment 
abroad is that it has been so extravagantly praised and extolled in 
the United States (even as reflected in our tendency to invoke it as 
a law of first recourse, rather than as a matter of last resort), that 
literate critics abroad, once piercing the fraudulence of such a 
claim, are at once inclined to dismiss the amendment as well. The 
argument that no parchment barrier (even assuming it may be judi-
cially enforceable) is either a necessary or a sufficient proof against 
judicial vagary or persistent intolerance was made in this country 
very early and equally forcefully and well. It was altogether smartly 
put forward in Alexander Hamilton's own best argument against 
the usefulness of providing a Bill of Rights. In Federalist 84, 
Hamilton made his argument with particular reference to the 
pointlessness of providing special protection for freedom of the 
press, in terms I know to be still fashionable abroad: 
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition 
which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it 
to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, what-
ever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution re-
specting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on 
the general spirit of the people and of the government. And 
here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion, must we 
seek for the only solid basis of all our rights. 81 
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 514-15 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. (1961)) 
(footnote omitted). 
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The point is well taken; American history is littered with illus-
trations which amply fulfill it. The first amendment did not fore-
stall the enactment of the Sedition Act82 a bare seven years follow-
ing its ratification, 83 it did not keep away the Espionage Act84 
following World War I, 85 it did not inhibit passage of the Smith 
Act86 just prior to World War II87-and all of these were sustained in 
highly repressive applications as· not unconstitutional abridgments 
of speech or press. 88 Even publication of the Pentagon Papers (the 
revelations of which were rather mild and whose compromise of 
"national security" was not at all self-evident) failed to command 
unanimity of judicial protection against the effort to suppress that 
publication. 89 
Indeed, not until 1931 was a single state statute invalidated in 
the United States by the Supreme Court on the ground that it 
trespassed the constitutional protection furnished to freedom of the 
press. 90 Moreover, not until 1965 was an Act of Congress held in-
valid by the Supreme Court on grounds that it violated the first 
amendment. 91 As literate foreign jurists are well aware, moreover, 
sensitive and well-regarded contemporary American judges have 
evidently shared Hamilton's very skeptical view. Thus, late in his 
career (that included Nuremberg as well as our own Supreme 
Court), Robert Jackson somberly observed: "I know of no modem 
instance in which any judiciary has saved a whole people from the 
great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny 
which have threatened liberty and free institutions. "92 Much to the 
82. Ch. 73, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired March 3, 1801). 
83. For a review of the early cases and a telling critique of the whole period, 
see L. LEVY, THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960). 
84. Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (current version at U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (1976)); see 
also E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA (1963); J. LOFTON, 
supra note 18; F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES 333-44 (reprint 
1970) (Phil. 1849). 
85. The cases are fully (and critically) reviewed in Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1941). 
86. Ch. 439, § 2, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 
(1976)). 
87. The Smith Act is quoted, applied, and sustained in Dennis v. United States, 
341 u.s. 494 (1951). 
88. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
89. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
90. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
91. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
92. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Gov-
ERmiENT 80 (1955). 
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same effect is the equally familiar observation of Judge Learned 
Hand: 
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much 
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false 
hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the 
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, 
no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court 
can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no con-
stitution, no law, no court to save it. 93 
I am aware of no satisfactory basis for dismissing these complaints 
because I think they are entirely well taken. Our own history 
stands against the notion that the first amendment is a sufficient 
condition against a general intolerance; it readily yields ample illus-
trations of zigzag vagaries of judicial "deference."94 
Nevertheless, it may also be true that these criticisms are ac-
tually too fundamental, i.e., that they presuppose too strong a case 
proposed in defense of the first amendment, thus overlooking a 
more moderate view of the matter. The case cannot now be made 
and was not made in the beginning that the first amendment is ei-
ther crucial or sufficient. Rather, the case was suggested, and may 
even now be maintained, that it is simply more helpful than not. 
Even the amendment's principal sponsors felt that it would be 
merely so. Discussing the subject in his correspondence with 
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson suggested that so far as relying 
on the people, elevation of particular rights in a permanent, writ-
ten constitutional text might at least afford a visible source more 
helpful than mere omission as a reminder of those rights. 95 As to 
the courts, Jefferson noted (in anticipating Marbury v. Madison96), 
a "declaration of rights" will "put into the hands of the judiciary" a 
"legal check" which, whatever the difficulties of marginal applica-
tion, might be useful when popular sentiment flagged. 97 With no 
illusions that judges would be either sufficiently resolute or able 
without support to stand against every crisis, and with none that a 
93. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LmERTY 189-90 (1953). 
94. For a recent critique, the very title of which sums up this thesis, see 
Kurland, The Irrelevance of The Constitution: The First Amendment's Freedom of 
Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1979-1980). 
95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, from Paris (March 15, 
1789), reprinted in part in THOMAS ]EFFERSON, supra note 63, at 462, 462-64. 
96. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
97. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 76, reprinted 
in part in THOMAS }EFFERSON, supra note 63, at 462, 462. 
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written Bill of Rights can per se keep the spirit of a free press 
alive, Jefferson concluded with a moderate optimism that even now 
seems surprisingly mature: 
The declaration of rights, is, like all other human blessings, al-
loyed with some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully its 
object. . . . But though it is not absolutely efficacious under all 
circumstances, it is of great potency always, and rarely ineffica-
cious. A brace the more will often keep up the building which 
would have fallen, with that brace the less. 98 
A very nice phrase, "A brace the more," which is probably about 
what one would want: The first amendment as a useful reinforce-
ment "not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances," but 
"rarely inefficacious." 
The reflections by James Madison, the principal author of the 
first amendment, were no more pretentious than those of Jefferson. 
Writing to Jefferson on October 17, 1788, but a few months after 
the eleventh state had ratified the Constitution, Madison summed 
up his view in favor of adding a bill of rights in the following diffi-
dent observation: "I have favored it because I suppose it might be 
of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice. "99 Then, 
a little less than a year later, addressing the House of Representa-
tives in support of the Bill of Rights he has just proposed, his en-
thusiasm is correspondingly mild: 
I will own that I never considered this provision so essential to 
the Federal Constitution as to make it improper to ratifY it, until 
such an amendment was added; at the same time, I always con-
ceived, that in a certain form, and to a certain extent, such a pro-
vision was neither improper nor altogether useless. 100 
The value, he suggests in the same address in Congress is, in part: 
"[i]f they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tri-
bunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner 
the guardians of those rights. "101 And Madison's notes, jotted down 
98. I d., reprinted in part in THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 462, 462-63. 
99. Letter From James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, from New York (Oct. 17, 
1788), reprinted in V THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269,271 (G. Hunted. 1904) 
[hereinafter cited as }AMES MADISON]. 
100. Address by James Madison before the United States House of Representa-
tives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in V }AMES MADISON, supra note 99, at 370, 380. 
101. I d., reprinted in V }AMES MADISON, supra note 99, at 370, 385. 
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to guide this extemporaneous address in Congress, sum up the 
matter in this fashion: "Bill of Rights-useful not essential . . . . "102 
It is noteworthy that the vagaries of judicial construction, the 
unreliability of Bills of Rights in times of felt crisis, their ultimate 
inadequacy even against persistent majoritarian intolerance, are all 
anticipated by our first amendment's own principal backers who, 
presumably, would correspondingly find the actual subsequent po-
litical and judicial history of the first amendment no very great sur-
prise. It is at least as noteworthy, however, that they could also 
readily locate an impressive series of adjudications granting point, 
purpose, and application to the first amendment when other 
"checks and balances" on majoritarian and parliamentarian intol-, 
erance have failed. 103 It appears to furnish about "12% difference" 
for the better. 
102. I d., reprinted in V }AMES MADISON, supra note 99, at 370, 389. 
103. Whether under the common law of seditious libel, the Race Relations Act, 
the official Secrets Act, varieties of contempt powers, anti-obscenity (or "decency" 
acts), privacy laws, disorderly conduct, breach of peace, commercial regulations, per-
mit controls, parliamentary supremacy principles, or the simple absence of a "first 
amendment" as the basis for resisting equivalent "laws," it is at least highly doubtful 
whether equivalently protective decisions can be found among the English decisions 
for any but a very few of the following cases: Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); 
Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Miami Herald Publishing Co., v. Tor-
nillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713 (1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 
415 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557 (1969); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines 
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); 
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 274 (1967); 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Cox 
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 
(1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 
(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 
(1945); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The vast ma-
jority of cases providing effective vindication of first amendment rights against state 
and local measures do not generate any review in the Supreme Court. For an im-
pressive recent example, see Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 518 
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 
373 N.E.2d 21, 14 Ill. Dec. 890 (1978). 
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So modest a difference, though conforming well to the expecta-
tions of the first amendment's own endorsers, may of course seem 
deflating. But it ought not be so. Rather, it may furnish some addi-
tional circumstantial evidence that, at the margin, an equivalent 
provision equivalently superintended may usefully commend itself 
to prudent persons in other nations not dramatically dissimilar from 
our own. 104 
CONCLUSION 
Most of this essay has been devoted to the recent rediscovery 
of first amendment syntax. By paying a little more attention (than 
has recently been customary) to the actual text of the first amend-
ment, it has been noted that the amendment may mean that differ-
ent kinds of protection are to be provided for press-related free-
doms than for speech-related freedoms. Thus, the amendment 
declares: 
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or 
[the freedom] of the press. 
In keeping with this rediscovery, it has not been much argued that 
"the press" must include literally any person who may happen to 
own or have access to any device capable of producing more than a 
single copy of printed matter. So broad a definition as this, leaving 
out virtually no one at all, fails usefully to say anything significant 
104. In their seminal review of criminal jury trials in the United States (the 
right to such trials being a constitutional fixture of the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments, much as the right to free speech and press are constitutional fixtures of the 
first and fourteenth amendments), Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel raised a similar 
question: The extent to which juries made any significant difference and, accordingly, 
whether as an institution, they were worth the bother. H. ICALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY (1966). One part of their inquiry was to determine the extent to 
which juries tended to acquit an individual despite ample evidence of guilt, 
operating in this manner as an institutional veto on laws properly adopted and 
doubtless constitutional but simply not acceptable to some juries. Their best estimate 
was that the tendency of juries to do so was fairly slight, but nonetheless significant 
at least with respect to certain kinds of crimes. Thus they note at the very end: "We 
have noted that at this moment in history the jury's quarrel with the law is a slight 
one. But there have been times when the difference was larger and such times may 
come again." Id. at 499. Essentially, that is also what is being argued here with re-
spect to the value of an entrenched first amendment as a limitation on parliamentary 
supremacy: For the most part, the difference between the judiciary's perception of 
what the first amendment allows and that of legislatures has in fact been a slight 
one. But there have been times when the difference was larger and such times may 
come again. When legislatures (and juries) share a joint intolerance, moreover, even 
a modest difference of judicial review may be important. 
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by way of distinguishing individual speakers or lone pamphleteers 
from those to whom the latter clause in the first amendment may 
in fact be specially addressed, namely, the press. Thus, to gain a 
more useful start on the problem, the more commonsense notion 
has been to begin with the most obvious and least controversial ex-
ample of "the press," and thereafter to resolve the inclusion or ex-
clusion of other parties by tests of functional verisimilitude with 
that press which, at a minimum, is indisputably part of "the press." 
The most obvious example of "the press" is the example of regularly 
published, privately owned newspapers of general circulation. Em-
phatically these were part of "the press'' in 1791 when the first 
amendment was ratified. Surely they remain so today. 
From this seemingly modest, attractive, safe, and altogether 
logical starting place, "the freedom" of this press thought to be spe-
cially protected by the clause is linked by argument with the gen-
eral public's power of self-government. By emphasizing the general 
news-furnishing service of professional reporters associated with 
regularly published, privately owned competitive newspapers, the 
linkage with informing the public-acting as the public's "agent" as 
it were-is thought to be very significant. Its significance is in two 
parts. The first part is doctrinal, that is, it (allegedly) provides a 
basis for determining what is the freedom of the press that explains 
why the press may sometimes successfully rely upon first amend-
ment privileges or immunities not available to others. The second 
part is definitional, that is, it (allegedly) provides a basis for 
determining who in addition to competitive newspapers of general 
circulation may also be members of "the press" that is meant to be 
specially protected by the press clause of the first amendment. 
Doctrinally, the linkage between public information and news-
papers of general circulation "as an agent of the public at large,"105 
or as "bring[ing] fulfillment to the public's right to know,"106 is 
invoked to expand press freedoms beyond the mere speech free-
doms of individuals, by way of analogy to doctrines of ius tertii. By 
relying upon first amendment rights in the public to receive infor-
mation concerning public issues, and by noting that curtailment of 
newspaper publication and curtailment of reporters' claims of ac-
cess, confidentiality, and immunity must necessarily operate to cut 
the public off from a primary and perhaps sole source of informa-
105. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, ]., dis-
senting). 
106. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, ]., dissenting). 
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tion germane to the needs of self-government, the description of 
"the press" as public agent or fiduciary enables the press to argue 
that the third-party first amendment claims of the public are inex-
tricably bound up with its own freedom. Thus, special access to 
courtrooms, legislative meetings, jails, etc., can be pressed in cir-
cumstances where the bar to entry might be valid against others. 
Similarly, subpoenas might be resisted-more importantly to pro-
tect prospective sources of significant information than prior confi-
dential sources-which others might not successfully resist. And 
equally, limitations on liability that others might not successfully 
claim may be asserted-lest the intimidating effect of broad liabil-
ity result in excessively squeamish editorial reluctance to publish 
anything other than demonstrably provable material. The general 
direction of the ius tertii argument, in rounding out the wider cir-
cumference of "the freedom" of the press thus comes readily into 
view. 
Definitionally, the logical ramifications of "the press" as agent-
of-the-public-right-to-lmow may very well presume to revise our 
notions as to what constitutes "the press." Currently, a political-
party functionary, a merely curious citizen, an NAACP designee, a 
local radio station reporter, a budding author, and an AP stringer 
all have roughly the same first amendment credentials. Doctrinally, 
the proposed view of the press clause we have examined would ap-
pear to favor the AP stringer in a variety of significant ways-
related to the press as agent of the public right to lmow-not appli-
cable to the merely curious citizen. Definitionally, the local radio 
station reporter is more like the AP stringer than like the merely 
curious citizen. The political-party functionary, the NAACP desig-
nee, and the budding author are at the edge, arguably "in," but 
probably "out." To be sure, each has some communicative constit-
uency in mind (in the case of the budding author the likely constit-
uency may be somewhat speculative), although none otherwise fits 
any conventional notion of a member of "the press." Thus, in 
terms of the functional verisimilitude of each such person (i.e., a 
reporting and informing function), each arguably has some third-
party standing akin to that of the conventional reporter. From a 
less functional perspective of what may pass for a member of .. the 
press," on the other hand, each tends to fail. 
The approach is generally very beguiling, however, and per-
versely, the fact that it introduces a "new' issue into constitutional 
law probably actually adds to its attractiveness. Far from making 
one quake at the prospect of having to deal with an issue we have 
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not previously regarded as an issue at all, the idea of writing about 
and adjudicating who shall be deemed a member of "the press" for 
purposes of special first amendment privileges and immunities is 
postively charming. It is the very kind of thing lawyers and judges 
are most fond of doing: "Recognizing" a hard issue and proceeding 
to draw lines, offering distinctions, making comparisons-and ex-· 
panding the complexity of constitutional law. 
Nevertheless, spoilsport as it is, the burden of this essay has 
been to urge some further thought before rushing on like lawyers 
to the thrill of defining "the press" for purposes of applying a sepa-
rate regime of first amendment analysis. And the reason for 
counselling such hesitation is not related to any problem associated 
with any difficulty of defining "the press"; to the contrary, lines can 
of course be proposed and the very prospect of redefining the 
fourth estate is itself so exciting that one's desire to get on with 
that task may make us impatient with any argument that would 
postpone it or deny its importance. The reason is, rather, to take 
stock of where this effort is likely to lead us, and what is likely to 
follow quite logically from the success of our efforts. 
Essentially, I have argued that the newly imputed importance 
of relating freedom of "the press" to an "informed public" is a gift 
horse whose teeth should be closely examined by the donee. Many 
who link the press with a .public right to know in fact have in mind 
a very logical and not-at-all-hidden agenda. It is the public agenda 
to rationalize new laws more adequately insuring that "the press" 
will serve the public right to know. It is the vision of a new 
equalitarianism quite hostile to the old libertarianism. It contem-
plates that a specially protected press shall also be, accordingly, 
specially responsive to community needs; that it not publish only 
what its proprietors deem fit or marketworthy; that it be fair, re-
flect diversity, and provide access; that it take on by force of first 
amendment doctrine what radio and television currently take on by 
force of the FCC. 
I have argued also that while linking "the press" with the fact 
of its large audience may in some respects establish special privi-
leges in that press, frequently the fact of the "large audience" 
yields a reason for greater liability (and greater susceptibility to 
prior restraints) than when no such large audience is implicated in 
the utterances of an individual. The larger the audience, the 
greater the danger of certain kinds of harm. Consequently, the 
greater the danger of certain kinds of harm, the greater is the justi-
fication for more severe standards of liability to avoid those harms. 
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The point, once again, is simply that the fact of "large audience,, 
like the fact of "third-party interest," does not necessarily make for 
more protection. Frequently it is the datum that justifies greater li-
ability. Press buffs may have imagined that a separate regime for 
"the press" must be all gain (and no loss) for reporters and for 
newspapers. A different forecast would have it that a separate re-
gime for "the press" may yield a handful of advantages and a har-
vest of disadvantages. 
In the end, however, my objection is still more fundamental. It 
is that the linkage of third-party interests is neither present in ev-
ery case involving a newspaper nor absent in every case involving a 
citizen attached to no publication of any kind. It therefore cannot 
distinguish constitutional clauses, although it will often distinguish 
constitutional cases. Forced disclosure of other members' names of 
a widely disliked voluntary association, for instance, threatens the 
first amendment freedoms of those other members and not merely 
the first amendment freedom of the particular witness under sub-
poena. Insofar as that is true in a given case, it is a matter appro-
priately to be considered in determining whether, under the cir-
cumstances, the subpoenaed witness cannot be compelled to make 
that disclosure. And when it is true, moreover, it makes no differ-
ence at all that the witness is not a journalist, a reporter, or a 
member of"the press." Rather, it is an issue of proper first amend-
ment solicitude that cuts across both clauses, applying "neutrally" 
for such weight as it deserves. The same is true in reverse. An in-
dividual who calls a witness to answer truthfully as to what the in-
dividual actually said to the witness at some earlier time (which 
discussion he now wants to be disclosed in court) has as good a 
claim to require an answer whether the witness is a reporter or 
whether he is some other person wholly unconnected with a news-
paper. For the reporter to claim extra protection from having tore-
spond to the very person whose actual conversation he now prefers 
not to have to repeat seems very strange indeed; it makes no sense 
at all so far as encouraging confidences by news sources when it is 
the news source himself who wants it brought out. This would also 
be the case if the witness were a doctor and the party seeking his 
testimony was his patient, or if the witness were an attorney, and 
the party seeking his testimony had been his client. Third-party 
first amendment interests thus do not systematically distinguish 
"press" cases from "speech" cases and, accordingly, cannot conceiv-
ably be serviceable as a litmus test either for defining "the press" 
or for guaranteeing it a "preferred" position. 
